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"TOlOVVTeS ?
for
THE CLASSICAL REVIEW
125 iravovprfOTaTov Xoyov
?py
Philippic 1. 10 ' Xeyerai ri KCUVOV ' ;
yivoir av ti Kaivorepov K.T.X. ; I do not
feel sure that we should not read Xeyoir'
av for yevoir' av. The parts of yi-
yvo/iai and Xeyopai certainly inter-
change ; sometimes both appear as
various readings in MSS.
H. RICHARDS.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE INTERJECTION ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENTENCE.
I. IN the following paper I propose to
show that the fundamental type of sen-
tence consists of a vocative and an im-
perative, that the vocative and impera-
tive forms are primitive, and that they
are derived from the interjection. If
my attempt is successful, it will be
necessary to revise and even to recast
the traditional scheme of grammar.
The Report of the Joint Committee
on Grammatical Terminology presents
in the clearest possible form the outlines
of grammar as understood by English
scholars of to-day. It has seemed best
therefore to offer what I have to say, in
the form of a criticism upon their re-
port. It may save misunderstanding
further if I admit that I do not regard
language simply' as an expression of
thought but as an expression of the
whole personality. This is really the
main point at issue.
I have not been so unreasonable as to
suppose that the committee were blind
to the obvious facts with which I have
to deal, and therefore I have tried to
give them credit for an amount of sym-
pathy which does not appear on the
surface of their report. Perhaps the
tone of my paper may seem offensive.
The size of the committee must be my
excuse. The virtues of a committee are
usually in inverse ratio to its size.
When Horace asked the question :
ridentem dicere verum quid vetat ? he ap-
pealed to the example of the Roman
teachers of Latin who, we are told,
handed buns round in order to relieve
the monotony of Latin grammar. Now
although Horace uses the plural, doc-
tores, it must be understood that the
distribution of buns was made by the
individual teacher and not by the Roman
committee on elementa prima. When,
therefore, Lucilius said: gustavi crustula
solus, we must suppose that he had a
teacher all to himself. But laughter,
as Sterne says, ' adds something to our
fragment of life,' and is therefore better
than a bun. If it is impossible to
combine the statement of grammatical
principles with amusement, I must
throw up my hands, and confess that,
on my interpretation of the facts of
language, there is room for an occasional
chuckle.
II. The current method of Latin
grammar is based upon the logical ana-
lysis of written expression. I say Latin
grammar, because in what follows we
shall be mainly concerned with Latin.
But this will not prevent us from getting
light from Greek and English grammar,
and to be quite candid from throwing a
little light upon both English and
Greek grammar. The reader may
think this promise somewhat presump-
tuous, and, indeed, I should not have
ventured upon it, if I had not felt that
the Joint Committee on Grammatical
Terminology in their report had not
given sufficient place to language as
expressing impulse and emotion. On
p. 15 the decree goes forth 'that sen-
tences be classified as follows in all the
five languages: statements, questions,
and the expressions of desire.' Ex-
clamations are relegated to a note and
are limited to a certain class of sen-
tences : ' Those introduced by pro-
nouns, adjectives, or adverbs, which in
other contexts are either interrogative
or relative, but are here exclamatory.'
However admirable the Latin gram-
mar (as understood by the committee)
may be, it does not cover the whole of
the ground; it does not account ade-
quately for the phenomena of oral ex-
pression. We are compelled therefore
to go further afield, and in doing so we
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light at once upon a considerable number
of fresh facts. And these facts group
themselves round the interjection. Quite
independently of my preparations for
this paper, I came across a striking
passage in Tylor's Primitive Culture
(I3, 176). ' The philologist's concern
with [interjections] is to study their
action in expressing emotion, and to
trace their passage into more fully
formed words.' The whole of Dr.
Tylor's chapters on emotional and imita-
tive language may be referred to as a
foundation for the argument which
follows.
We must begin by facing the ques-
tion fairly: what is the object to which
grammarians direct themselves ? Do
they mean written language or spoken
language? To this I reply that all
language properly so-called is to be
regarded as spoken. It is only by an
accident that it comes to be written.
Language therefore is oral expression.
And we should remind ourselves, on.the
one hand, that much oral expression is
incapable of being reduced to writing,
and, on the other hand, that much
writing which passes for language is
nothing of the kind.
III. But oral expression is only one
form of human expression. A true
workman expresses himself in his work,
as do the engineers who keep our
great steamships going, and so on. It
throws the whole subject of grammar
out of key if we confine ourselves to writ-
ten language and to statements and
questions which, as the committee say,
correspond to logical judgments.
IV. I am glad that the committee
referred to logical judgments. They are
evidently conscious that grammar can-
not be understood entirely from within
itself. And in their wish to get help
they have had recourse to psychology.
For, although Kant has said that there
is no such science as psychology, he
has been confuted by the history of
that science. And I am encouraged to
fall back upon my own limited know-
ledge of psychology by the example of
the committee. We shall not treat
human beings therefore simply as giving
rise to articulate sounds which can be
reduced to order with the help of the
logician. Now, since the majority of
the readers of the Classical Review are
scarcely likely to know so much psy-
chology as the committee, I will warn
them of their danger lest they should
fall into a dreadful heresy which is
known as the ' faculty psychology.'
By this is meant that one separates
thought from feeling, and both from
will; as though you could conduct
your thoughts without being influenced
by feelings, and vice versa; or as though
you could either think or feel or act
without at the same time doing some-
thing of all three.
V. Now it is because the committee
are unlikely to have fallen into so
obvious a mistake that I venture to
carry out what, I am sure, must have
been their intention. In their report
on Grammatical Terminology they
omitted to say very much about the
oral expression of feeling, not because
they overlooked the facts which I have
stumbled upon, but because it is very
difficult to get a committee to agree
upon everything, and they felt that if
we regarded grammar as mainly an
exercise in the logical judgment, it was
at least something. Most practical
grammarians are uncomfortable in the
presence of feeling and action; and
after trying to make room in my own
case for the expression of feeling and
action, I am inclined to sympathise.
VI. At the same time we must not
shrink from following out this topic
somewhat further. If we are to be
complete grammarians, we must study
in a little detail the behaviour of
human beings, so that we may under-
stand the manner in which their be-
haviour finds expression in language.
In particular, what is the stage at
which man, as a matter of course,
employs statements and questions
which, as the committee says, corres-
pond to logical judgments ? This high
estimate which the committee enter-
tains of the human intellect came as
somewhat of a shock to me, because I
had always understood that by nature
man was imperfectly equipped with
reason, and that the use of Latin gram-
mar in education was to supply this
imperfection in the work of the Creator.
Monsieur Anatole France has expressed
a similar thought in his own incom-
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parable way. He is looking back to the
good old times. ' By learning Latin
the pupils learnt something infinitely
more precious than Latin. They learnt
the art of directing and expressing their
thought.' Now, although I cannot
claim to have entered into the full pos-
session of this heritage, it is obviously
necessary that we should find a place in
our scheme of human behaviour for that
delightful attitude of mind which, owing
to their study of Latin, the committee
shares with Monsieur France. This we
will call the attitude of understanding,
expressed in statements and questions
which correspond to logical judgments.
VII. But what is the typical attitude
or attitudes of the great mass of man-
kind, including the skilful engineer and
myself ? At any rate we can use things
for our own ends, even if we cannot
reflect upon them very clearly. The
engineer's vocabulary would perhaps
illustrate the subject of this paper with
more emphasis than would suit the
pages of the report on Grammatical
Terminology. But this could at least be
said about him: he would be perfectly
sincere. There would be no affectation
of making statements which correspond
to logical judgments. Without going
into unnecessary detail, many engineers
use interjections, vocatives, imperatives
and other exclamations in the most vivid
way. This is the primitive attitude of
man contending with his surroundings
and using such tools as come to hand.
We can all reach, or pass through, this
attitude. Hence we can now proceed
to mark off two attitudes of man—first,
that of practice or use; second, that of
understanding.
VIII. It is difficult to make some
people (especially those scientific men
who have learnt Latin) understand that
there is an experience higher than the
formation of logical judgments. Man-
kind cannot be dismissed offhand into
two classes: those who havejearnt ' the
art of directing and expressing their
thought,' and those less fortunate ones
who have not so learnt. There is a third
attitude of man to other persons and
things—namely, the attitude of sympathy.
We no longer contemplate things and
persons from the outside; we enter into
their intentions and tendencies. Now it
is quite possible to be deeply sympa-
thetic, and yet to fail of that logical
perfection towards which we are con-
ducted by Latin grammar. Dr. Fennell,
in his excellent edition of Pindar's Odes,
was perplexed by the style of the poet,
and delivered himself as follows: ' Most
of the difficulties in Pindar's Odes arise
from his rapidity and fulness of thought,
which often seems to have made him
sacrifice the formal expression of the
connexion of his ideas.' This statement
is not altogether clear, but I understand
it to mean that Pindar's attitude to life
was not one of calm understanding.
For no state of mere understanding
would make us ' sacrifice the formal ex-
pression of the connexion of our ideas.'
On the contrary, where you have perfect
understanding ' all is ordered luminous,
simple.' I am quoting Monsieur France
on Livy. ' Livy is not a profound
genius; but he is a perfect pedagogue.
He never moves us, and for that reason
we-read him without any keen pleasure.
But how regularly he thinks! How
pleased he is to show his thought, to
examine all the pieces of it, and to ex-
plain the part which each of them plays!'
I said to myself when I read this pas-
sage: 'There is a description of the com-
mittee on Grammatical Terminology.'
At the same time, among the members
of that committee, I recognise the names
of several friends of mine whose know-
ledge of Pindar is much greater than
any to which I can myself aspire. They
are in the committee, but not entirely of
it. They show that it is possible not
only to utter sentences and questions
which correspond to logical judgments,
but to penetrate further into the heart
of things, and to unveil the hidden things
of the classical literatures. Neither
understanding nor the absence of under-
standing is the key to this third form of
apprehension, but a heart that vibrates
in response to the eternal voices. At
any rate, I can count upon their assent
to the very modest proposition which I
will lay down now as the main thesis of
this paper: the analysis of language from
a logical standpoint does not account for
all the forms of which grammar must take
account. Or, in other words, oral expres-
sion is organically related not only to
thought, but to action and feeling.
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IX. Some one may say, however,
that the committee have made adequate
provision for the expression of feeling,
on p. 15, in their third category of
desire. But for some reason or other
they are careful to distinguish sentences
expressing desire from exclamations,
and therefore from the expression of
feeling. I will confess that I do not
understand the point of view of the
committee. Surely the expression of
desire involves the expression of feeling!
Desires, we are told, include commands,
requests, entreaties, wishes. From
this it would appear that desires roughly
answer to the use of the imperative
mood. And this is the sense in which
I shall take leave to understand the ex-
pression of desire. From our point of
view we shall regard the imperative
mood as an ejaculation, no less than
the fourth form of sentence which is so
regarded by the committee.
Curiously enough if we examine the
exclamations which the committee
separate from the other forms of sen-
tence, they will be found to consist at
the root in nouns used as ejaculations.
Que de fleurs ! what nonsense! a> j3ddo<;
IT\OVTOV K.-T.X. There is reason to think
that the verb in such phrases as Ut
peril is no real exception. We may
compare the phrase with 0 me mis-
erum !
X. Now if we combine the imperative
mood with the vocative, which is the
simplest form of the noun used in ejacu-
lations (that is, if we combine the com-
mittees ' expressions of desire ' with
their ' exclamation'), we arrive at a well-
defined form of sentence: Ave, Caesar;
Lugete, 0 Veneres Cupidinesque; Quaere
novum vatem, tenerorum mater amorum.
In English we have: Blow, blow, thou
winter wind ; Go, lovely rose ; Ruin seize
thee, ruthless king ; and so on. Such
sentences are the proper expression of
feeling and action. They are specially
characteristic of everyday life. Any one
can satisfy himself of this by listening
to the passers-by.
But I do not think it has been
observed that this type of sentence is
frequent enough in literature to demand
special attention. I open by chance,
Every Man in his Humour. The first
words of the dialogue are:
A goodly day toward ! and a fresh morning !
Brain worm,
Call up young master. Bid him rise, Sir;
Tell him I have some business to employ him.
Two interjections and then two sen-
tences that begin the action of the play.
Take a case where such sentences in-
terrupt the current of ordinary state-
ments. How beautifully, in the para-
basis of the Knights, two such sentences
occur! the prayers to Poseidon and
Athena. We want a name for this sort
of sentence. Perhaps the term active
is as good as we can find. Such a sen-
tence is more than a bare imperative:
it is more than a bare vocative. There
must be the combination of the noun
and the verb. If we wanted a technical
description, perhaps the term judgment
would be convenient. Unfortunately
the term judgment has been confined
by the grammarians and logicians and
psychologists to something which is not
so much a judgment, as a theoretic
opinion.
For to judge is more than to hold an
opinion. When we judge we express both
our feeling towards an event or person,
and the demand which arises out of
such a feeling.
We are prepared now to meet a
striking fact. The Lord's Prayer is
exclusively composed of active sentences
or judgments. It begins with a voca-
tive which is understood along with all
the succeeding expressions of desire.
In like manner the National Anthem
illustrates throughout the type of sen-
tence with which we are occupied.
In the distinction which we have
thus established between the active
and the theoretic sentences, we secure
a touchstone of style. Of course, now
that the distinction has been pointed
out the writers of prize poems will
doubtless take account of it. But it is
interesting to thread one's way through
the jungle of English hymns with this
as a clue. Most of our fine hymns
begin with an active sentence. Where,
however, the first sentence is of the
narrative form, the effect is rarely
tolerable, unless the verb is one of
prayer or praise. I cannot refrain
from one instance of an obvious failure.
The congregation is addressing God,
and they begin with the tame state-
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ment of the time: The day is past and
over! I should like to think that a
similar line of inquiry may lead, in
the hands of abler critics, to important
results in the classical literatures.
XI. 1 do not wish to pride myself
unduly upon the discovery which was
announced in the last paragraph. For
the committee on Grammatical Ter-
minology were only prevented from
making it by their admirable but ex-
cessive devotion to the philosophy of
Aristotle. They recommend on p. 8,
' that the first stage in the analysis of
a sentence be to divide it into two
parts, to be called the subject and the
predicate.' For example: The merci-
ful man is merciful to his beast. Here
is merciful to his beast is the predicate
and the merciful man is the subject.
Now in the philosophy of Aristotle,
the subject is regarded as the sub-
strate of qualities, and the predicate
is attached to this substrate. Aristotle
frequently employs another turn of
phrase. He says TO yS virapx^i rm a
as well as TO a etm TO /S. If we para-
phrase our typical sentence it will run:
The quality of being merciful to his beast
pertains to the merciful man. In other
words, the analysis of the sentence
into subject and predicate turns upon
the Aristotelian conception of sub-
stance. Hence, what the committee
speaks of as a sentence (p. 8) is really
a theoretic opinion expressed in the
form of Aristotelian logic. If only the
committee could have shaken off the
trammels of logic! Let the reader
compare the beginning of my tenth
section with the contents of the pre-
ceding section; he will see that I rightly
acknowledged my indebtedness to p. 15
of the report. The committee describe
Statements and Questions indeed in
accordance with the rules of Aristotle
(compare p. 8). But when they are
left to themselves they describe Desires
and Exclamations in such a way, that
we only needed to combine the two in
order to obtain the judgment proper
or active sentence.
XII. We are now going to take
the active sentence as the type to which
other forms of sentence may be referred.
We begin by discarding the term subject
from grammar. There is no useful
office performed by this word, which
cannot be rendered by the term person.
The subject of the verb is the person of
the verb. And, if you say that a person
is not a thing, and therefore it is
ridiculous to describe gold as a person
in the phrase gold glitters, I reply that
gold is a person, just as much as it, in it
glitters, is the third person. But, further,
gold is masculine in Greek and French;
French can say of gold, il brille. Our
use of the word person, therefore,
answers to the fact of gender, and is
more appropriate to the genius of
language than the philosophical term
substrate. In English we have still the
ship to remind us of the time when
gender applied to English nouns. In
other words, person throws us back
upon the time when all language pal-
pitated with life.
XIII. The term predicate must be
dismissed along with the term subject.
For we are told by the committee, on
page 8, that sentences are to be analysed
into subject and predicate. Strictly
speaking, the term predicate icwmyyopov-
fievov should be limited to assertions.
Hence expressions of desire scarcely
admit of predicates in the proper sense.
What, for example, is the predicate in
Long live the King? The committee
answers, Long live. But this is not
merely asserted, it is commanded, or
prayed for. I shall not labour this
point further, but shall go on to the
fourth form of sentence—exclamations.
How true! Que de fleurs ! We are told
that the adverbs are exclamatory. In
that case we have a phrase consisting
of an exclamation and a nominal form.
Here then, at any rate, there is no
predicate.
Let us turn back to the active
sentence. This consists of a vocative
and a verb, or, as we may now say, a
person and a verb. Does the verb
supply us with the term we want. I
think it does. The verb denotes move-
ment and change, together with their
contradictories. Even in the verbs
that express rest, the rest is not static
but dynamic. For example, the verb to
be is completed in some language from
the verb to stand, and the standing
implies standing firm, that is, against
resistance.
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In a word, the active sentence refers
action and reaction to a personal agent.
The term predicate implies the bare
addition of a label to an imperfectly
developed object of thought. Hence
the active sentence is infinitely more
frequent in daily life than the logical
sentence.
XIV. We have thus seen reason to
lay down another type of sentence than
that to which the distinction of subject
and predicate applies. The active sen-
tence answers to the language of com-
mon life as distinguished from the
language of reflection. For this latter
the logical sentence is appropriate.
Unfortunately the grammarians have
tried to reduce the active sentence to
this latter type. In so doing they
have not only distorted the language of
ordinary busy life: they have failed to
do justice to the language of sympathy
and the deeper emotions generally.
XV. This will involve a recasting of
grammar in order to make it corres-
pond more closely to the order of facts.
I will conclude by a brief summary of
the lines along which the grammar, first
of the interjection, second of the verb,
and then of the noun, requires to be
reconsidered.
XVI. The interjection will come first
in our grammar. Do you remember
how in Rudyard Kipling's story, The
Man Who Was, the returned officer was
recognised by the vowel sound upon
which his weeping was pitched ? This
may serve as a parable for us. There is
a profounder vernacular than that of
articulate language. Man weeps, laughs,
snores, wonders, rejoices.
Nor is the menagerie silent. Our own
cockadoodledoo does not correspond to
life so closely as the co co co co of Petro-
nius, nor is baa baa black sheep so realistic
as the be be of Greek literature.
XVII. Then will come the parts of
speech which are nearest to the inter-
jection. In the verb we must follow
the example of Mr. Magnus in the
Pickwick Papers, and conjugate ourselves
into the imperative mood. There is
considerable evidence that this was a
primitive form. Lauda, mone, rege, audi
are both the stems of verbs and the
second singular of the imperative Vel
falls into its place as the imperative
NO. CCXLVII. VOL. XXIX.
of volo. Compare the derivation of if
from gif. The analogy of vel supports
this derivation. Die, due, fac, fer help
us to understand vel; the lack of the
terminal vowel is due to the indeter-
minate character of the vowel which
follows the stem in the third conjuga-
tion.
XVIII. The subjunctive is to be
treated first as an ally of the imperative
and ultimately of the interjection.
Benedicite is paralleled by benedicamus.
Where are we to draw the line as we
conjugate faciam, fac, facial, faciamus,
facite, faciant ? It is at this point, there-
fore, that the subjunctive must first enter
our grammatical scheme. We must
correct Roby therefore. 'The subjunc-
tive mood,' he says, 'as distinguished
from the indicative, expresses an action
as thought or supposed, rather than as
done or narrated.' The subjunctive is
nearer than the indicative to the com-
mand, the interjection. It emphasises
the will, the desire. Hence we contrast
it as doing something, with the indica-
tive which is the narrating of something.
Nor can I accept without qualification
the report on the Terminology of Gram-
mar, xlii. The reference of the subjunc-
tive to future time is only secondary;
this reference arises from the impera-
tive meaning which as we have seen,
may be treated as primary. The com-
mittees quote the question: quid faciam?
the reply should be hoc age. Certainly
it would not run hoc agere te oportebit.
The footnote of the committee is unfor-
tunately phrased. The reference to the
future is not intrinsic, but adventitious.
XIX. If we consider the example just
given, we can see how the deliberative
subjunctive arises out of the impera-
tive. And from the deliberative there
may come the use of the subjunctive in
indirect questions. Quid ab hac metuis ?
Quid ego metuam, rogitas. ' Do you
inquire what I am to fear ?' We might
regard this indirect question as an inde-
pendent clause, and compare the whole
phrase with such constructions as quid
mihi dicent, demiror (Ter. Ph. 234).
XX. The beginnings of the final con-
struction may be seen in such colloca-
tions as cura valeas. Such construc-
tions are obviously to be treated as
primary, and are not to be explained
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by the omission of ut. They may be
compared with phrases like iures pos-
tulo. The misunderstanding of these
constructions is due to the undue post-
ponement of the imperative in the
scheme of grammar.
In the limits of this paper I can only
suggest the derivation of the delibera-
tive and the final subjunctive from the
imperative. The reader can consider
for himself how the subjunctive after
relative pronouns and adverbs, and
also the subjunctive in reported speech,
may be traced back to the impera-
tive. English will furnish a clue. Our
own indirect speech shows relations
with the imperative. Dr. Johnson is
perplexed by the use of should be in
reported speech, and quotes Bacon:
' There is a fabulous narration, that in
the northern countries there should be
an herb that groweth in the likeness
of a lamb.' Compare an idiom still
current: He is one who should know.
Est qui sciat.
XXI. Turning to the noun, we shall
at once be led to the vocative as the
typical interjectional case, and as the
nearest to the primitive form. Like
the imperative, the vocative (where
there is a form separate from the
nominative) contains the stem. This
is seen more clearly in Greek. Owing
to the importance of the vocative, both
actually in speaking and historically, it
would seem appropriate to put it before
the nominative.
XXII. The interjectional use of the
dative is seen in phrases like quid mihi
Celsus agit? Now it is probable that
the case endings of personal pronouns
are older than other case endings.
Hence we will venture to argue from
the form of mihi. The ending -hi is
probably implosive—that is to say, a
gasp. The whole group of endings, -hi,
-bi, in Latin, and -<j>i, in Greek, may be
compared with the interjection, fie, and
its cognates (cf. Sweet, History of
Language, p. 35). It is tempting to
imagine that the i which is common
to all dative singulars in Latin was
developed by analogy from mihi.
XXIII. I have offered these few illus-
trations of my main thesis, because
they are fairly certain. To have gone
further would unduly lengthen this
paper.
FRANK GRANGER.
NOTES
THEOCRITUS, IDYLL XV. 112. TERENCE, EUNUCHUS, 835-839.
MSS. : irap fiev 01 a>pia KSITCU, oaa
Bpvos aicpa (f>epovri. Meineke points
out that fiev 01 is unmetrical, as the
digammated Foi should lengthen fiev
by position, cp. 25. 82. His own sug-
gestion oircbpa is, however, hardly con-
vincing. Perhaps the original reading
was—Trap fiev off' copia Keirav, oaa bpvos
aicpa <f>ipovTi, ' Beside him lie the
season's fruits, even all that the oak-
sprays bear.' For the use of 00-09 as
correlative to oaos, cp. Idyll IV. 39,
oaov aZye? ifilv <f>iXat, oeraov a/trka^a<i;
Oppian Cyneg. 4- 210 oaov %a$ov oaaov
epegav. The letter change in uncials is
of course slight, and might arise through
misunderstanding of the idiom.
R. J. SHACKLE.
Marlborough College, Wilts.
PYTHIAS. .Habemus hotninem ipsum. THAIS.
Ubii^est? PY. Em, ad sinisteram.
Viden ? TH. Video. PY. Comprendi iube,
quantum potest.
TH. Quid illo faciemus, stulta ? PY. Quid facias
rogas?
Vide amabo, si non, quom aspicias, os impudens
Videtur ! TH. Non est ? PY. Turn quae eius
confidentiast!
So these lines are given in TyrrelFs
texts. L. 839 is the crux. The MSS.
vary in attributing the non est either to
Thais or to Pythias. For non est turn
Fleckeisen and Wagner read turn autem,
which has the merit of meaning some-
thing at least. But there is a well-
defined type of comic sentence which
can easily be extricated from beneath
the debris of non est turn. Fabia quotes
two examples in his note—
